Venture capital and risk in high-technology enterprises by Reid, Gavin C. & Smith, Julia A.
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Reid, G.C. and Smith, J.A. (2003) Venture capital and risk in high-technology enterprises.
International Journal of Business and Economics, 2 (3). pp. 227-244. ISSN 1607-0704
Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research output of the University of Strathclyde.
Copyright c© and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors
and/or other copyright owners. You may not engage in further distribution of the material for any
profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://
strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the content of this paper for research or study, educational, or
not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge.
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to Strathprints administrator:
mailto:strathprints@strath.ac.uk
http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/
 
 
Reid, J.G.C. and Smith, J.A. (2003) Venture capital and risk in high-
technology enterprises. International Journal of Business and Economics, 
2 (3). pp. 227-244. ISSN 1607-0704 
 
 
 
http://eprints.cdlr.strath.ac.uk/3851/
 
 
Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research 
output of the University of Strathclyde. Copyright © and Moral 
Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download 
and/or print one copy of any article(s) in Strathprints to facilitate 
their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not 
engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any 
profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely 
distribute the url (http://eprints.cdlr.strath.ac.uk) of the Strathprints 
website. 
 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to The 
Strathprints Administrator: eprints@cis.strath.ac.uk 
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Abstract 
We find UK investors and entrepreneurs are significantly concordant in rankings of in-
vestments and key factors for risk but significantly discordant on risk classes. Investors em-
phasise agency risk (e.g., motivation, empowerment, alignment), and entrepreneurs emphasise 
business risk (e.g., market opportunities). 
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JEL classification: D8; M2; M4 
1. Introduction 
This paper focuses on three questions within an applied principal-agent frame-
work (cf. Francis and Smith, 1995; Reid, 1998; Sapienza et al., 2000; Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2001). The applied context is venture capital investing with the investor 
as principal and the entrepreneur as agent (Reid, 1996, 1998, 1999). The questions 
are: how risky are investments, what affects risk most, and do investors and entre-
preneurs agree on these matters? We address these questions using interview evi-
dence on attitudes to risk for a sample of UK investors and entrepreneurs in 
high-technology enterprises (cf. Lefley, 1997; Murray and Marriott, 1998). We used 
two semi-structured interview schedules of parallel design. These allowed us to take 
respondents through a common agenda in face-to-face interviews to determine atti-
tudes to two classes of risk: business risk and agency risk. 
Business risk is caused by the complex, competitive environment in which 
high-technology firms function. It arises because of the inability of industrial 
economists, accountants, business forecasters, etc., to predict with any precision the 
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prospective value of a new product in the competitive marketplace. Not only do in-
novation risks “feed forward” into business risks (e.g., in the sense of timing of ini-
tial market entry of a product), but also business risks arise from action-reaction 
effects within the marketplace, as rivals attempt to accommodate to the marketplace 
implications of innovative steps. This is very often done in a strategic fashion, e.g., 
by pre-emption, emulation, imitation, backward engineering, etc. In a sense, firms 
are “racing” to be first to get an entitlement to the intellectual property (IP) embod-
ied in a new technology. Thus firms will redouble effort if they are very close to 
rivals but will quickly give up if they seem outstripped in the race. 
Agency risk (Sapienza et al., 2000) arises, in general, from an incomplete 
alignment of incentives between principal and agent. In our case, the principal is the 
venture capital investor and the agent is the high-technology entrepreneur. The root 
cause of agency risk is information asymmetry between principal and agent. One 
way in which agency risk, deriving from this, can be reduced, is by superior infor-
mation systems. Briefly, investors are risk specialists, who know a little about tech-
nology and a lot about monitoring and control. They are willing to back their 
judgements with large injections of equity finance. Typically, entrepreneurs are im-
mersed in technological developments and are risk averse and starved of cash. They 
would prefer a less risky life and more financial backing. They also need advice and 
guidance on commercial imperatives. In theory, a “contract” should be struck in 
which the entrepreneur gives the investor access to potentially valuable intellectual 
property (i.e., “property” based on new ideas) and the management skill to create it 
in exchange for which the investor bears some of the risk and provides an infusion 
of equity finance (Reid, 1998). In practice, it may be hard for the investor to evalu-
ate the entrepreneur’s claim to be able to produce valuable intellectual property, and 
the mere fact of backing an entrepreneur tends to diminish the incentive to continue 
to be creative in this respect, unless activity is tightly monitored. 
Using the above framework, we report on two key findings. First, there is gen-
eral agreement between investors and entrepreneurs concerning the relative riskiness 
of investments, e.g., start-up, expansion, management buy-in (MBI). This finding 
suggests a common industry view on relative investment riskiness (cf. Bhat-
tacharyya and Leach, 1999; Beetsma and Schotman, 2001). Second, a difference is 
found between investor and entrepreneur concerning factors which affect risk ap-
praisal. Investors are more concerned with agency risk (Sapienza et al., 2000), fo-
cusing on the monitoring and control relationship with their entrepreneurs. Entre-
preneurs too have a concern for agency risk but are more concerned with business 
risk. In principal-agent terms, this suggests successful shifting of agency risk from 
entrepreneur to investor. It is concluded that investors and entrepreneurs generally 
do view risk in the same light but, when their views differ, this is explicable by a 
principal-agent framework. 
 
2. Principal-Agent Analysis 
The theoretical underpinning of the empirical work we undertake here is that of 
principal-agent analysis (Ross, 1973; Mirrlees, 1976; Baiman, 1982) as applied to 
the venture capital investor (as principal) and the high-technology entrepreneur (as 
agent) (Chan, 1983; Chan et al., 1990; Reid, 1998). Here, we summarise key con-
cepts of the theory in a general schema. 
In a familiar way, this theory (e.g., Reid, 1989, ch. 9) assumes that people are 
self-interested. If they can hide, with benefit, some of their actions from others, they 
will seek to do so. This creates the danger of moral hazard, in that, post-contract, 
agents may shirk (i.e., fail to work as hard as they could and/or personally consume 
benefits which would otherwise accrue to others). In doing so, they enjoy perquisite 
consumption (i.e., perks), for which the principal bears a proportion of costs.  
Figure 1. The Principal-Agent Setting for Investor and Entrepreneur 
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The theory explains why investor-entrepreneur relations will be created and the 
forms they may take in terms of the contractual arrangement between investor and 
entrepreneur (see Figure 1). If in receipt of any surplus created, the investor has no 
motive to shirk. He directs activities and will seek, at the contract interface, to estab-
lish systems for monitoring and rewarding the entrepreneur and for attenuating 
shirking (see Figure 1). The aim of contractual design is to encourage the entrepre-
neur to act in ways which are aligned with the investor’s aims. The goal will be to 
limit shirking and to elicit optimal effort (cf. Frederickson, 1992). Thus the investor 
diminishes the contractual advantage the entrepreneur seeks through exploiting in-
formation asymmetry (cf. Healy and Palepu, 2001). The latter may arise from the 
greater knowledge which the entrepreneur has of high-technology and of rivals. This 
information asymmetry, coupled with moral hazard, presents a circumstantial prob-
lem for the investor, for which monitoring and control systems provide some kind of 
remedy (Wright and Robbie, 1996; Mitchell et al., 1995, 1997, 1999). 
Economic applications of principal-agent analysis are well known (Ross, 1973; 
Mirrlees, 1976; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Radner, 1985; Holmström, 1979). Ex-
tensions to cognate areas, like accounting and finance, have been undertaken by the 
likes of Baiman (1982), Magee (1998), and, in textbook form, by Kaplan (1982) and 
Scapens (1991). These extensions show how the firm itself creates a demand for 
information. Further, the need to monitor and control entrepreneurs’ behaviour re-
quires a flow of information from the firm to the venture capital investor. For exam-
ple, accounting measures of actual performance, financial analyses of decisions, 
budgets and financial plans may all contribute to the provision of a basis upon which 
the firm’s performance can be assessed (Ouksel et al., 1997; Reid and Smith, 2000; 
Sahlman, 1994).  
The availability of appropriate financial controls and decision support can also 
be viewed as helping to direct the entrepreneur’s behaviour in accord with the in-
vestor’s interests. In addition, if incentives such as entrepreneurial remuneration or 
even entrepreneurial retention are to be based on performance, there is an important 
role to be played by information on the financial dimension of that performance. To 
play these roles, such information has to be accepted by both investor and entrepre-
neur and should therefore possess sufficient “hardness” and reliability to adequately 
reflect an entrepreneur’s actions (Mutch, 1999). 
Information provision may be influenced by a variety of factors relating to each 
specific principal-agent relationship. Obvious instances, relevant to our inves-
tor-entrepreneur setting, include: 
1. Ownership and control (Bricker and Chandar, 2000; Francis and Smith, 
1995). The greater is the divorce of ownership and control (which, in turn, may mir-
ror the size and complexity of the high-technology firm), the greater is the need for 
information about the firm to be made available to the investor. 
2. The degree of incentive given by the entrepreneur’s compensation package. 
For example, where the entrepreneur’s rewards are heavily based on performance, 
which matches the investor’s aims, the need for monitoring information (as a sur-
veillance and control function) will be lesser (Nouri and Parker, 1996). 
3. Conversely, the more sophisticated is the monitoring system put in place, 
the less will be the need for the investor to base the entrepreneur’s remuneration on 
the performance levels achieved (cf. Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001). 
4. The greater is the complexity and uncertainty associated with the entrepre-
neur’s role and work, the greater is the information asymmetry which exists, and the 
more will the emphasis have to be on monitoring inputs and outputs as opposed to 
processes (cf. Mitchell et al., 1999). 
The use of information and monitoring systems, as outlined here, is an attempt 
to limit one source of risk (viz. agency risk) which arises from information asymme-
try between investor and entrepreneur. 
3. The Use of Risk Classes 
Following Fiet (1995a, 1995b), and Moesel and Fiet (2000), we think in terms 
of “risk classes” rather than in terms of point estimates of probabilities (which are 
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often impossible to obtain). We find that simple classifications of risk (e.g., high, 
medium, low) are often adequate, if not perfect, substitutes for statistical estimates 
of probabilities. Our questionnaire design used Likert scales to determine (on a scale 
of 1 to 5) the perceived risk by respondents (be they investors or entrepreneurs) of 
specific events, e.g., types of investment like start-up, management buy-out (MBO), 
management buy-in (MBI), etc.  
The assigning of risk in our study has to be subjective (Moesel and Fiet, 2001). 
This does not involve mere guesswork but high-level “clinical judgement.” For ex-
ample, skilled judgements may be made by using yardstick comparisons (e.g. with 
parallel technological developments). Many respondents thought it was satisfactory 
to think in terms of “risk classes” rather than numerical probabilities. Thus, we 
found that rankings of riskiness were adequate, if not perfect, substitutes for statisti-
cal estimates of probability. 
Of the two classes of risk we have emphasised (agency and business) it is 
thought that agency risk is the one that has been most successfully confronted in the 
high-technology context. Risks derive from inefficiencies, all of which ultimately 
revolve around problems of information and risk-bearing. For example, the entre-
preneur may be better informed than the investor about the product and may also be 
more risk averse. If information were perfect, doubt and uncertainty would not at-
tach to decision-making and investors could choose best actions with complete con-
fidence. However, information is not perfect, and investors have to proceed by using 
imperfect information as effectively as possible, at the same time as trying to rem-
edy in some measure these imperfections (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001). Thus the 
venture capitalist will be motivated to create an information gathering system which 
will help him to overcome his relative ignorance and thus to decrease the risk of his 
decision-making environment. Proceeding in this way, the investor will be better 
equipped to avoid the tendency for the entrepreneur to pass all the risk on to him. 
The venture capitalist becomes a better judge of the performance of the entrepreneur 
and, in refusing to accept all of the risk, keeps the entrepreneur on his toes.  
Although UK venture capitalists are becoming increasingly skilled at attenuat-
ing agency costs, they have not yet progressed so far as their US counterparts in us-
ing powerful, so-called “boilerplate” contractual terms (Murray and Marriott, 1998). 
Further, though they have relative success in managing agency risk, venture capital-
ists must increasingly turn their attention to business risk. This arises from the un-
certain environment within which the quest for competitive advantage is pursued by 
the entrepreneur (e.g., in terms of innovation, new and existing rivals, substitutes, 
and shifts in customer tastes). This is a less controllable class of risk in that factors 
like the market attractiveness of a high-technology product sold by the entrepreneur 
are partly (e.g., by advertising) but not entirely amenable to manipulation. Along this 
dimension, therefore, contracting is frequently informal, but the relationship is rela-
tively proactive, which aims to compensate for the informality. 
The relative ignorance of business risk on the part of the investor (cf. Murray 
and Marriot., 1998; Freel, 1999) has partly arisen from a natural tendency to spe-
cialise in the controllable area of risk, namely agency risk (Sapienza et al., 2000). It 
would be inefficient for formal investors to attempt to proceed in the way that, say, 
“business angels” (i.e., informal investors) might. The latter might seek to address 
the problem of business risk by having such a close relationship (proactive, 
“hands-on”) with an entrepreneur that business risk is relatively effectively handled. 
From the formal investor’s position of relative ignorance, information relevant to 
business risk is costly to acquire and difficult to evaluate, and this proactive route is 
less attractive and almost certainly not cost effective. Instead, the investor has to 
seek to “incentivise” his relationship with the entrepreneur more effectively (see 
Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001). 
4. Data: Fieldwork and Sampling 
4.1 Fieldwork 
We started our fieldwork by approaching key experts. These included the 
chairman of the British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) and a leading invest-
ment manager at the largest venture capital firm in the UK (3i). They provided a 
contemporary setting for our work. Further, a Director from the UK Patent Office 
gave us a current view of contemporary practice in the protection of intellectual 
property, including its significance for high-technology. 
When designing the questionnaires, our aim was to ensure comparability be-
tween investor and entrepreneur attitudes. Therefore, the agenda were the same for 
each questionnaire. During interviews, which could take several hours, we gathered 
considerable bodies of evidence on how investors and entrepreneurs handled risk. 
For each interview, we gathered over eighty numerical responses and over forty 
qualitative (text) responses.  
4.2 Investor and Entrepreneur Samples 
The second stage of the research involved: (a) determining sampling frames for 
both venture capitalists and high-technology companies, and (b) selecting samples 
according to certain sampling criteria. The sampling frame for venture capitalists 
was obtained from the Venture Capital Report (VCR Guide, 2000) CD-ROM. This 
lists most UK venture capital firms under a number of headings. Our aim was to 
construct a random sample of twenty venture capital firms (investors) subject to 
their being actively involved in the high-technology area. The sampling frame for 
high-technology firms (entrepreneurs) was also obtained using the VCR CD-ROM. 
It was used to search for entrepreneurs that were developing, making, or marketing 
high-technology products. In determining the “technological intensity” of our sam-
ple of entrepreneurs, use was made of our contacts with the Patent Office at Newport 
(Wales, UK). On-line facilities enabled us to select those entrepreneurs which were 
most patent-intensive in their innovative activities. We preferred this independent 
route of access to high-technology companies rather than the judgements of inves-
tors, which might be less objective. The number of venture capitalists interviewed 
was twenty, and the number of high-technology firms was five. 
 Table 1. Investors Participating in Fieldwork 
 
 
Full-time VC 
Executives
Investments 
per annum
Funds managed 
(£m) 
3i (Group plc) 285 320  2000  
Scottish Equity Partners 10 n.a.  150  
Amadeus Capital Partners Limited 14 n.a.  88  
Schroder Ventures 25 10  4209  
UK Steel Enterprise Limited 10 50  4  
Wales International Fund Limited n.a. n.a.  n.a.  
British Coal Enterprise n.a. n.a.  n.a.  
Murray Johnstone Private Equity Ltd 23 25  373  
Top Technology Limited 3 7  35  
Thomson Clive Ventures 11 5  148  
Catalyst  2 4  30  
Wales Fund Managers Ltd 3 5  Not disclosed  
Friends Ivory & Sime 10 68  110  
Standard Life Investments 10 n.a.  Not disclosed  
Penta Capital Partners Ltd 8 n.a.  142  
WL Ventures Ltd 2 n.a.  2.3  
Albany Ventures 4 n.a.  40  
Bank of Scotland Structured Finance 120 n.a.  n.a.  
Abingworth 6 5  79  
3i (Scotland) n.a. n.a.  n.a.  
Averages 32 45  529  
The venture capital backers of high-technology firms whom we interviewed are 
listed in Table 1. They account for the great bulk of the UK funds allocated to 
high-technology ventures. The average fund size (in terms of funds managed) was 
£529m, the average number of venture capital executives was 32 and the average 
number of investments per year was 45. The biggest player by a magnitude, is 3i. 
Schroder Ventures appears to have large volumes of funds because the UK total is 
not cut out of the global operations of the global financial body of which they are 
now a part. 
These companies run the gamut, from small specialist providers of venture 
capital for high-technology firms to large structured finance providers for funds 
rather than entrepreneurs. In the former case, the equity provision is direct and the 
degree of involvement with entrepreneurs can be close. In the latter case, the finan-
cial provision is usually directly to a fund, but the right to do “direct” deals with 
promising entrepreneurs is retained and occasionally exercised. Typically, the in-
volvement with high-technology entrepreneurs is more “arms length.” 
The entrepreneurs numbered five in all and were chosen according to three cri-
teria: (1) that they appeared under a high-technology heading in the Venture Capital 
Report Guide to Venture Capital in the UK and Europe, (2) that they were highly 
active in patenting to protect their intellectual property in the high-technology area 
(cf. Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; Jaffe, 2000; Kortum and Lerner, 1999), as evi-
denced by searches on the Patent Office database esp@ce.net, and (3) that they were 
in, or close to, technology parks attached to London, Oxford, or Cambridge. The 
entrepreneurs that participated in our research have their company names suppressed, 
because of commercial sensitivity. The technologies represented are diverse, and run 
across several disciplinary areas, including computer science, electrical engineering, 
biochemistry, mathematics, electronics, physics, and telecommunications. Specifi-
cally, their principal products or services were: (a) cancer drug development, (b) 
thermal imaging, (c) copyright protection, (d) e-commerce acceleration, and (d) light 
emitting polymer displays. In practice, the companies were all close to, or within 
reasonable distance of, the so-called M4 high-technology corridor. These entrepre-
neurs have been considered in some detail, by case studies vignettes, in Reid and 
Smith (2001). 
5. Attitudes to Risk 
In our interviews, we defined risk classes as categories of similar degrees (or 
types) of risk. Grouping risk in this way can aid effective risk management (cf. Moe-
sel and Fiet, 2001). Most investors (95 per cent) thought of their investments as be-
longing to appropriate risk classes. One investor, typical of many, said that, when 
risk classes needed defining, “We would do it by stage of investment.” Another in-
vestor, again quite typical, said, “We’d look at risks in specific areas—for exam-
ple, … market and manager (people) risk.” The latter comment is notable for its ref-
erence to our chosen risk categories of business risk and agency risk. 
Both investors and entrepreneurs were able to rate investment opportunities by 
risk class. This was be done by stage of investment (see results in Figures 2 and 3). 
Both investors and entrepreneurs were asked to say how risky they rated different 
types of investment, using a six point Likert scale (Oppenheim, 2000, ch. 11; Janko-
wicz, 2000). Options were listed in the following order: seed, start-up, other early 
stage, expansion, MBO, MBI, turnaround, replacement, follow-on. Based on these 
Likert scores we computed rankings of investments. Figures 2 and 3 represent (by 
the length of the bars) the mean rankings of perceived risk, by investment types, 
according to the views of investors and entrepreneurs, respectively (see also Reid 
and Smith, 2000, where scores are used rather than rankings). 
In terms of statistical inference, both sets of rankings displayed in Figures 2 and 
3 are highly significantly different from a random assignation of ranks, using the 
Kendall W test of concordance (see Gibbons, 1985, ch. 13). Test statistics and prob-
ability values were: χ2(8) = 97.90 (p-value virtually 0) and χ2(8) = 31.487 (p-value 
0.0001), respectively. Thus, both investor and entrepreneur rankings are coherent 
and purposive. Further, a comparison of the mean rankings of investors and entre-
preneurs suggests that rankings are not statistically significantly different at the 5% 
level: χ2(8) = 14.533 (p-value 0.069). That is, investors and entrepreneurs rank in-
vestment opportunities similarly. 
 
Figure 2. Investors’ Attitudes to Risk 
The investors ranked seed-corn, start-up, other early stage, and turnaround in-
vestments as being the four most risky investment types (Figure 2). Entrepreneurs 
actually ranked the same four investment stages as having the highest risk, but with 
turnaround and early-stage reversed. Thus both investors and entrepreneurs seem to 
follow what is suggested by theories of venture capital (e.g., Chan, 1983; Chan et al., 
1990) and small firms (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982; Frank, 1988). Our interpretation 
would be that both emphasise the importance of market experience. Lack of it raises 
risk. The entrepreneur has to “learn” by doing when it comes to small business 
management. The learning curve has to be steep, as competition is usually strong.  
At start-up, learning has scarcely begun. Arguably, the entrepreneur is not well pre-
pared for dealing with surprise events that impinge on the firm. Also, the investor is 
usually quite unsure of how to appraise the ability of the entrepreneur. It takes time 
and skill to put incentives and checks in place that will ensure the entrepreneur is 
“singing from the same song sheet” as the investor. In short, agency risk is high. 
Seed-corn and start-up are therefore judged to be especially risky, by investor and 
entrepreneur alike. We also observe from Figures 2 and 3 that investors and entre-
preneurs both view turnaround as highly risky. This is because turnaround often fol-
lows on from a period of bad performance, certainly of the entrepreneur, but possi-
bly also the initial investor(s). Turnaround is often associated with major restructur-
ing within the firm as well as re-contracting of the investor/entrepreneur relationship. 
This all increases risk.  
Disagreement between investor and entrepreneur is atypical but is evident for 
the management buy-out (MBO), for example. It is natural to think of this as the 
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least risky type of investment, as the company and the team who run it are very 
much a known quantity. This clearly is the perception of the investor. Indeed, the 
management team will be even more incentivised by the buy-out. Entrepreneurs are 
more cautious about this class of investment (which they rank next to turnaround in 
riskiness in Figure 3), probably because they could conceive themselves to be put-
ting their reputations on the line with the buy-out, though not putting themselves in 
such a risky situation as would occur with a buy-in (ranked next highest in Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Entrepreneurs’ Attitudes to Risk 
Follow-on investments were judged by investors and entrepreneurs as being 
relatively low risk. However, the low average perceived risk does mask some diver-
sity of opinion. To illustrate, several investors observed that “It all depends on the 
follow-on.” This suggests that follow-on per se may not be less risky than other 
forms of investment. It could be that “sample selection” is occurring, with the more 
risky follow-on opportunities being screened out by investors. The same could be 
said of replacement capital. It may be quite low risk (on average) from an investor 
standpoint, but they were aware that some forms of replacement (e.g., following the 
death of a dynamic founder) could be fraught and highly risky. 
Figure 6. Investors’ by Entrepreneurs’ Scores of Riskiness by Investment Types 
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A convenient way of examining concordance, which does not seem to have 
been used in the literature, is illustrated in Figure 6. This new representation pro-
vides a direct comparison of the investor and entrepreneur views on risk, in a way 
which directly relates to statistical tests for concordance. The raw data are Likert 
scores (rather than rankings) of investors (vertical axis) and entrepreneurs (horizon-
tal axis). Complete concordance would imply that all observations should lie along 
the 45º line going through the points (1, 1) and (6, 6). As we see, there is very little 
divergence of opinion. The main divergence is on point E, which relates to the MBO, 
as discussed above. A regression line through the scores of Figure 6 gives the equa-
tion 
y = 1.313×10-2 + 0.962x, 
2
0.874R = , F = 56.286, p-value < 0.001 
   (0.030)    (7.502) 
(1) 
where y refers to investor score and x refers to entrepreneur score (t-values are in 
parentheses). The intercept is not statistically significant, and the slope coefficient is 
highly statistically significant (p-value < 0.001) and somewhat less than unity. Thus 
the fitted regression line lies just below the 45º line. This alternative display of evi-
dence, using scores rather than ranks, and regression rather than concordance esti-
mation, gives very similar results. Further, the graphical display of the extent of 
concordance provides useful insight into similarities of views between investors and 
entrepreneurs when it comes to perception of riskiness of investment stage. 
6. Factors in Risk Appraisal 
Investors and entrepreneurs were also presented with a list of fifteen factors 
which had a bearing on the risk appraisal of an investment. The factors which re-
spondents had to consider in this way included market opportunities, the global en-
vironment, the local environment, the quality of the proposal, the management 
model, the business model, the sales model, the scale of the business, etc. The full 
listing of factors is given in Figures 4 and 5. 
 
Figure 4. Investors’ Most Important Factors in Risk Appraisal 
Figure 5. Entrepreneurs’ Most Important Factors in Risk Appraisal 
In terms of statistical inference, both sets of rankings displayed in Figures 4 and 
5 are highly significantly different from a random assignation of ranks, again using 
the Kendall W test of concordance (χ2(14) = 98.952, p-value virtually 0, and χ2(14) 
= 24.519, p-value 0.039, for investor and entrepreneur, respectively). Again, we find 
that investor and entrepreneur views are coherent and purposive. However, in this 
case these views diverge somewhat. As contrasted with rankings on investment 
stages above, a comparison of the mean rankings of factors important in risk ap-
praisal suggests that investors and entrepreneurs have views which are statistically 
significantly different at the 5% level (χ2(14) = 23.408, p-value 0.05). In brief, views 
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 expressed on factors important to risk appraisal are themselves statistically signifi-
cant for both investors and entrepreneurs, and these views themselves differ signifi-
cantly between investors and entrepreneurs. 
As Figure 4 indicates, investors thought that (on average) the management team 
was the most important factor in the risk appraisal of an investment. This factor is an 
aspect of agency risk. Other factors which were ranked as being highly important by 
investors are also relevant to agency risk, these being the extent of motivation and 
empowerment within the potential entrepreneur company (second ranked) and em-
ployee capabilities (fourth ranked). Overall, these high rankings of organizational 
factors suggest that agency risk is very important to risk appraisal from the inves-
tor’s standpoint. Of course, as we have seen above, this agency risk has its source in 
uncertain and incomplete information between investor and entrepreneur. Entrepre-
neurs drive the firm forward, but the success with which they do so depends not just 
on their skills, but on how they, and the investors, handle incomplete information 
and uncertainty. 
To amplify the discussion, we should say that, from our interviews, we con-
cluded that investors used information systems heavily to manage agency risk. 
When we asked them about predicting cash flow, we found that three-quarters of 
investors explicitly modelled inter-relationships between variables in cash flow pro-
jections. Almost all investors used such techniques for planning. One investor ex-
plained his method as follows: “We do a lot of investment monitoring—especially 
where the funds are investing. We’re always working with the managers very closely. 
We measure profit against initial financial projections.” We found that most inves-
tors were committed to modelling the future profitability of their firms. This exercise 
was important to the formulation of long-run strategy for the firm. When engaged in 
formal modelling, the investor often drew upon entrepreneur opinion. One investor 
explained this symbiotic relationship as follows: “The assumptions you input to 
produce the model are assumptions about how the business will run. It’s an interac-
tive process.” Though a desire on the part of investor and entrepreneur to manage 
risk is evident in all principal-agent relations in practice, it is particularly strong in 
the high-technology setting. Here, risk is unusually high, and information asymme-
try is unusually acute. 
Consider now the investors’ assessment of the most important factors in risk 
appraisal compared to those of entrepreneurs (see Figures 4 and 5 again). It is inter-
esting to note that the extent of motivation, empowerment, and alignment (a crucial 
agency effect) is ranked second most important by investors but only 11th most im-
portant by entrepreneurs. Further, information system capabilities (another agency 
feature) are ranked as least important by entrepreneurs, whilst investors rank these 
three positions higher. These results suggest that, whilst there are similarities be-
tween rankings of factors important to risk appraisal between investor and entrepre-
neur, there are some noticeable differences, which can be explained by the different 
roles investors and entrepreneurs play in their principal-agent relationship. 
Also notable in Figures 4 and 5 are the importance to investors and entrepre-
neurs alike of factors like market opportunities, the business model, and the sales 
model. These factors all relate to “business risk.” The main source of this is uncer-
tainty about the future value of the entrepreneur’s business. This arises primarily 
because market opportunities are hard to judge. Even if they do prove to be promis-
ing, it is not known whether the entrepreneur’s untried ability will be up to exploit-
ing such new market opportunities, especially when faced with competitive pressure. 
The business model, market opportunities, the sales model, and the quality of the 
proposal are all ranked as important to risk appraisal by both investors and entre-
preneurs. Thus they display a common interest in dealing with business risk. Indeed, 
to the extent that the investor “solves” the agency problem or, to put it another way, 
efficiently “manages” agency risk, investor and entrepreneur interests are 
well-aligned, and they can then focus jointly on dealing with business risk.  
Business risk was further illuminated as a concept when we asked investors and 
entrepreneurs about their use of sensitivity analysis. One entrepreneur said, “From 
market assessment you can work out what a reasonable revenue and cost line would 
be. Management as a whole does the market analysis and we take a top down ap-
proach. We tend to be quite rigorous in doing a careful analysis of the market.” This 
suggests that business risk is best managed by allowing an interaction between en-
trepreneur and investor. We have already seen that this is true in the handling of 
agency risk. 
In Figure 7, we follow the logic of Figure 6. Again, the raw data are Likert 
scores of investor (vertical axis) and entrepreneur (horizontal axis), this time relating 
to the importance of factors to risk appraisal rather than to investment stage. Again, 
complete concordance would imply all observations lying on the 45º line. By con-
trast to Figure 6, we see that there is now considerable divergence of opinion be-
tween investor and entrepreneur, concerning certain factors important to risk ap-
praisal. These divergences include O (extent of motivation, empowerment, and 
alignment), M (employee capabilities), E (management team), and N (information 
system capabilities). These factors were all scored as being relatively more impor-
tant to the investor compared to the entrepreneur. In other words, whilst both inves-
tor and entrepreneur rank factors similarly, the weight they attach to rankings can be 
quite different. 
Figure 7. Investors’ by Entrepreneurs’ Scores of Importance of Factors for Risk Appraisal 
 Key  
A Market opportunities 
B Global environment 
C Local environment 
D Compelling nature of the proposition 
E Management team 
F Business model 
G Sales model 
H Scale of the business 
I Commitment to bring in others 
J Funding structure 
K Type of exit 
L Comparable investments 
M Employee capabilities 
N Information system capabilities 
O Extent of motivation, empowerment, and alignment
In particular, the investor, who very much “calls the shots” in determining the 
contractual relationship between investor and entrepreneur, is putting much more 
weight, as one would expect, on agency factors (e.g., motivation, alignment, em-
ployee capabilities, information systems, etc). 
A regression line through the scores of Figure 7 gives the equation  
y = 1.727 + 0.552x, 
2
0.270R = , F = 6.175, p-value 0.027 
   (2.362) (2.485) 
(2) 
where y refers to investor score and x refers to entrepreneur score (t-values are in 
parentheses). In this case, the intercept is statistically significant (p-value 0.034) and 
the slope coefficient is also statistically significant (p-value 0.027) but considerably 
less than unity. The magnitude of this slope coefficient suggests far less agreement 
between investor and entrepreneur than in Figure 6. If we look at the fitted regres-
sion line, we find it is now considerably skewed away from the 45º line of complete 
concordance, for most observations. What we have unearthed here is that, while 
views on ranks can be quite similar, those on scores can differ considerably, to an 
extent that highlights agency effects. 
7. Conclusion 
This analysis of attitudes to risk by investors and entrepreneurs in 
high-technology firms has focused on three questions: 
How risky are investments? 
What affects risk most? 
Do investors and entrepreneurs agree? 
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Our overarching framework was that of principal-agent analysis. We identified 
two risk classes, agency and business risk. We found that there was general agree-
ment between investors and entrepreneurs about which investments were relatively 
more or less risky. When it came to factors affecting risk most, there was some dif-
ference between investors and entrepreneurs. Agency risk was of more concern to 
investors than to entrepreneurs, suggesting, as agency theory predicts, that this 
component of risk has been shifted from entrepreneur to investor. Business risk was 
a prime concern to entrepreneurs but also a clear concern of investors in matters like 
market opportunities and sales.  
We conclude that investors and entrepreneurs generally see risk in the same 
light, but that, when views differ, this is explicable either by functional specialisa-
tion (viz. are you a producer or a funder?) or by attitude to risk (which itself reflects 
relative risk exposure of investor and entrepreneur). 
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